The Period of Primary-Ied Export Growth
During the rapid expansion of world trade that began in the latter part of the nineteenth century and lasted until World War 1, the Latin American economies became specialized in the exportation of primary goods. Most countries of the region relied on a small number of food products and/or raw material s for their foreign exchange earnings, and most imports consisted of manufactured products. The production of exportable goods was undertaken by the private domestic sector (e.g., coffee in Brazil, grains and livestock in Argentina) and by the foreign sector (e.g., copper and other mineral s in Chile, Peru, and Mexico; petroleum in Mexico and Venezuela; plantation agriculture in Central America, Peru, and Colombia). Foreign firms also often dominated commercial operations sUITounding these exports. In addition, a substantial amount of foreign investment went into infrastructure, such as railroads, urban transportation, power generation and distribution, and the telephone system. The direct involvement of the state was relatively small, though in several cases it assumed direct ownership of railroads, which were constructed with foreign financing.1
Tbe state provided a favorable atmosphere for private investment in that periodo For instance, it often guaranteed arate of return for foreign companies that invested in railroads; or taxes were relatively low on foreign firms investing in primary export sectors. Regulations were at a minimum and, where they existed, especially in the public utilities sector, they were usually favorable to foreign firms.
During most of this period the region had a free trade regime. Most import tariffs existed to raise revenues and were not protective in nature. Where the private sector was unwilling to enter, especially in providing credit to the agricultural sector, the state in a number of countries established banks. And in the provision of social serviceshealth and education-the state's presence was relatively weak (there were so me exception, such as the large investments in Argentinian education in the latter part of the nineteenth century). Of course, the population was mainly rural, which meant that the pressure for the provision of social services was relatively weak.
The ISI Period: From the 19308 to the 19608
The presence of the state grew rapidly in this periodo Earlier in the century some governments had bought out railroads, as they were unwilling to continue to guarantee arate of return to foreign enterprises. The depression of the 1930s, however, marked the beginning of a more active state in the economy. Controls began to proliferate-exchange controls, direct foreign trade control s, controls over tariffs charged by public utilities, production and marketing control s of agricultural and other primary products.
By the late 1930s Mexico had nationalized its petroleum and some mining sectors.
This nationalization served as a precedent for the nationalization of the petroleum and mining sectors in other countries of the region during the 1950s and the 1960s.
Nationalist governments felt that control over nonrenewab1e resources should be in the hands of the state.2
The growing government takeover of public utilities-railroads, power generation and distribution, telecommunications, and so on-was in part the result of govemment perception that these strategic sectors should be in the hands of the sta te. It was also the result of public utility tariff controls, which did not allow for adequate rates of return for their foreign owners. The latter were thus unwilling to make investments that would serve the needs of rapidly industrializing and urbanizing countries. The state therefore felt it necessary to nationalize public utilities, and the new state firms in these sectors received the necessary subsidies to modernize and expand power generation and distribution, telecommunications, and the like.
The adoption of ISI as the principal development strategy not only led many govemments to expand their public utilities, but also established state-owned firms in a number of basic industries, especially in the steel, metallurgical, and petrochemical sectors. The motivation was partially nationalist, but also was due to the fact that neither domestic nor foreign private firms were willing to pour large amounts of money into projects whose gestation period was relatively long. Finally, through the establishment of development banks (such as Brazil's BNDES, Mexico's Nacional Financiera, and Chile's CORFO), Latin American governments became important players in influencing the direction of investment resources and in influencing the private sector either through financing operations or through shareholder participation.
The ISI period witnessed a dramatic change in the role of foreign capital in the region's economies. Most Latin American governments realized that neither the domestic private sector nor the public sector had the technical and financial capacity to establish ISI industries rapidly. It was thus important to induce foreign firms to establish subsidiaries in new import-substituting sectors. This was achieved through a policy of protection, which was comp1emented by special inducements-such as tax holidays, and the permission to import machinery without foreign exchange cover.
Manufacturing, rather than public utilities, mining, and agriculture, thus became foreign capital's major field of operation.
The private domestic sector was not neglected in this periodo It al so benefited from protection and received subsidized loans from government development banks and other favors. In a number of countries there was an emphasis on rapidly increasing the vertical integration of new sectors. Thus multinationals were encouraged to make or buy components in the country. Domestic firms often became suppliers of mu1tinationals and in the process acquired new technological capacities.
For a while during the ISI process the state, the domes tic private sector, and private foreign firms worked together. They complemented and therefore strengthened each other. The presence of the state in this period "crowded in" rather than "crowded out"
the private domestic and foreign sectorso Many governments chose to pursue continued growth and public enterprises were used to capture foreign resources.5
In the 1970s, Latin American public enterprises began bOITowing from commercial banks rather than from the multilateral development banks, which had been their prime source of foreign capital in the previous decade. As the economic crisis wore on in the industrialized countries and international interest rates became sharply positive, many
Latin American countries became increasingly desperate to obtain foreign exchange to meet their rapidIy growing debt servicing needs. The use of public enterprises to capture foreign financial resources and provide macroeconomic stability undermined their microeconomic efficiency and identity firms. It also ultimately worsened the central government deficit. To the extent that a firm's losses were covered by government subsidies, they contributed to the increase in general government expenditures, to the government deficit (assuming that such subsidies could not be covered by increased taxes), and thus to further inflation. In addition, to the extent that the financiallosses of state firms resulted in a curtailment of investments, their efficiency declined further and so did their capacity to increase total output.
As public enterprises became less like firms and more like macroeconomic policy tools, the opportunity for economic and political abuse expanded. Where state firms were the sole producers of certain products that were crucial inputs for private firms, deliveries were often late unless an "urgency tax" (bribe) was paid. Or, where the private sector had state finns as the major customers, payments were often delayed beyond the time stated in contracts, unless side payments were made to obtain a quicker release of the money. Such monopolistic abuses increased the private sector's costs and thus reduced the general efficiency of the economy. 8
The use of public enterprises for attaining certain distributional goals has also contributed to the weakening of their microeconomic position. The control of public utility prices to favor lower income groups or productive sectors of the economy that the government wished to promote contributed to lower profits or increased losses of public sector finns. Of course, such losses could be subsidized by the state through higher taxes, but this was often politically impossible. The only feasible optíon for the government was to subsidize the firms, adding to its own budget deficit, or not to subsidize them and allow the firm's effectiveness in attaining its original goal s to be diminished.9
While the use of public enterprises for macroeconomic policy objectives may have had negatíve repercussions for the financial health of the finn, the benefits of their use might be thought to have outweighed the cost. The abuse of public enterprises for political purposes, however, has had a more decidedly negative effect. 
Trends in the 1990s
The ISI strategy has outlived its usefulness, the debt decade of the 1980s is finally over, and an era of liberalizatíon and privatization is well under way throughout Latín America. A new consensus regarding the role of the public and private sectors is beginning to emerge, based on several new trends and developments. A further examination of these new regionwide developments will help set the stage for a glimpse into the future in Latin America for the rest of the 1990s.
Gradual Opening of Borders
Latín America cannot export more without more efficient firms, and efficiency can be achieved only by having firms, which previously operated in a protected market, become exposed to international competition. This had led to a gradual opening of borders, with nearly all governments now allowing more imports of more modern technology. This opening has benefited local consumers and has al so led to more exports by local industry. The conventional wisdom of the 1980s was that Latin
America could not afford to allow more imports because it needed to generate trade surpluses to service the debt. Now it is recognized that governments cannot afford to keep their borders closed and that more imports willlead to more exports and a higher standard of living.
This gradual opening of borders has also helped revive discussions about regional trading blocs, such as MERCOSUR and the Andean group. They may be transformed from the impossible dreams of the 1960s into realities in the 1990s. But it may not be enough, as we shall see shortly.
Privatization of State Enterprises
The objective of most countries today is to withdraw the public sector from most productive activities, and some countries are even aiming to privatize public utilities (this has already occurred in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico). By withdrawing from direct participation in most economic activities, the state may be able to reduce the deficits that led to the borrowing and inflationary spiral of the 1970s and the 1980s.
As the case studies in the Property Rights, Privatization, and Regulation in Latin America conference reveal, privatization is being carried out in a variety of ways.
Some state firms are being privatized through sales to foreign firms (both public and private), often involving debt-for-equity swaps. The immediate benefit of such privatization is 10 provide additional income to governments, which underwent a substantial fiscal squeeze throughout the 1980s. A1though the sale of government enterprise involves only a one-time income for the state, it also reduces longer-term government expenditures by reducing the debt servicing usually required and freeing the state from having to provide subsidies to loss-making state enterprises.
Deregulation of L{)CalIndustry
While opening e borders and pL atization have grabbed most of the headlines in recent years, there has been another important trend. Governments have been gradually reducing their control over the daily activities of firms. Price control boards have been abolished, import permits for many goods have been eliminated, and governments no longer set wage policies (often because they no longer own the enterprises that used to be the trend setters in wages).
The Growth ofthe Informal Economy
This trend began in the 1970s, as many people became informal entrepreneurs operating outside of the formal economic system and usually earning only subsistence
wages. This was a response to the stifling control of the state. Many caIl it the first move toward privatization, as these entrepreneurs began their activities in areas in which the state enterprises and government did not perform effectively. In the 1980s, the informal economy served as a safety net for individual s left without jobs during the recession of that periodo The challenge for the 1990s is to incorporate them back into the formal economy.
The Emergence ofThree Major Trading Regions
Europe '92 has already led to nearly complete trade liberalization within Western But Brazil and Argentina, with their closer ties to Europe, are more reluctant to decide, and so have focused on the more modest MERCOSUR.
Challengefor the Future: An Effective Post-ISI State
While Latin America has undergone its most far-reaching structural changes in the last sixty years, the world around it has been changing even more rapidly, making the changes in Latin America seem modest or even timid in so me countries. Other countries have opened their borders more completely and privatized their industries more rapidly.
Latin American governments no longer have the funds to invest direcdy in order to spur growth and development, so they must attract investment into the region. But in the present world circumstances, they have to compete for those investments funds against other regions and governments with longer and more successful performance records.
The old ISI strategy has been replaced by these new thrusts based on opening of borders and privatization. While these changes were necessary in order to correct the problems of past decades, they are not sufficient for the 1990s. The role of an effective post-ISI state is still to be defined and delineated. The focus of most states in the 1990-1992 period was to tear down the old state, with les s attention given to construction for the 1990s. The elements of that new role, however, are beginning to emerge:
1. state investment in social infrastructure, especially hea1th and education, and the creation of a mínimal social safety net for all of its citizens;
2. creation of a broader and more equitable tax system, which allows more money to be collected more equitably and avoids the temptation to return to the inflationary finance so widely used in the past;
3. the state as a regulatory agency for public services and natural monopolies.
Although the state no longer owns most of the industries that provide most public services, it faces the same challenges that were so difficult to resolve one hundred years ag~how to regulate public transportation, telephones, utility companies, and so on, and balance the conflicting needs for low-cost public services versus reinvestment in these areas based on a reasonable profit. It is not
clear yet who the regulators should be and how they can be protected from undue pressure from interest groups. Are the regulatory models of the United States, or the European countries, or Japan relevant to the institutional situation of the Latin American countries?
4. encouragement of rather than ambivalence toward foreign investment. In a privatized and pen economy, the treatment of foreign capital has to be devoid of the type of special control s that nationalistic farces exercised after World War n, but also of the special deals of the nineteenth century, which often amounted to exploitation;
5. encouragement of local capital to stay in the country. The liberalization of recent years has attracted a substantial amount of flight capital back to home countries, especially to Mexico, Chile, and Argentina. Some of this capital has been invested in state firms that are being privatized, but much of it has been invested in regional stock markets. Governments now seem to recognize that, if they cannot persuade their local investors to keep their money in the country, they will not be successful at attracting foreign capital, which has become a centerpiece of their development strategies;
6. formation of regional capital markets. While flight capital has led to the recent boom in local stock markets, the development of these capital markets is crucial to long-term development. Government regulation must stop insider traders from making speculative profits by manipulating markets. This will give more investors the confidence to increase their investments and make regional capital markets a magnet for foreign capital;
7. more equitable distribution of income. None of these new policies will be successful or sustainable unless governments can reverse the record of the last twenty years in which the rich got richer and the poor got poorer. This may also imply a change in the behavior pattern of the Latin American private sector in relation to the state. A way must be fOllnd to "privatize the private sector," that is, to develop state institlltions, both reglllatory and credit, that cannot easily be captllred by powerflll special-interest groups.
While increased state investment in hea1th, edllcation, and a social safety net will help and a more equitable tax system can finance these investments, these steps will not be enough. Many governments will move toward a European rather than an American role for the state, that is, a state that is active in pushing for basic social programs and in offering guidence to industrial developments. This must mean a stronger role for private firms, in cooperation with government, in providing social services for their employees and communities. Better-educated and -trained workers help their finns to become more competitive, but they also become more effective citizens who provide better education for their children.
Latin America can feel justifiably proud of finally returning to a period of growth, after a grim period during the past ten years; however, a sustained economic recovery based on the twin pillars of liberalization and privatization will be successful only if the poorest segment of the society is more fully incorporated into the economy.
The post-ISI state, only now beginning to emerge, must focus on the development of all of its citizens by focusing on its new roleo It must augment and improve the provision of health, education, and other social services, and it must encourage the private sector to be a more proactive partner in this challenge for the 1990s.
